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THE EFFORTS TO LIMIT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT’S JURISDICTION OVER NATIONALS OF NON-PARTY 
STATES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
MARCO ROSCINI 
“Our actions, taken consistently with constitutional principles, 
require no separate external validation to make them legitimate. 
Whether it is removing a rogue Iraqi regime and replacing it, 
preventing weapons of mass destruction proliferation, or 
protecting America against an unaccountable court, the United 
States will utilize its institutions of representative government, 
adhere to its constitutional structures, and follows its values when 
measuring the legitimacy of its actions.” 
John R. Bolton1 
Abstract 
The purpose of this article is to discuss and compare the multilateral and 
bilateral efforts to prevent the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over 
nationals of states non-parties to the Rome Statute. In particular, the US 
secured the adoption of Security Council resolutions no. 1422 (2002), 
1487 (2003), 1497 (2003), 1593 (2005) and launched a campaign for the 
conclusion of bilateral non-surrender agreements: the differences between 
the resolutions and between them and the agreements are analysed. None 
of the resolutions above can be qualified as an exercise of the Security 
Council’s power to request the ICC not to commence or proceed with 
investigations or prosecutions under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, as this 
provision was not conceived to cover future and hypothetical cases. 
Furthermore, by adopting resolutions 1422 and 1487 and by including the 
paragraphs on the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing state in 
 
 Senior Lecturer, University of Westminster (mroscini@iol.it). This article 
represents an extended and revised version of a paper presented at the Conference 
on Immunities in National, International and Comparative Law organized by the 
Universities of Perugia and Verona (Perugia, 25–27 May 2006). I am grateful to 
the participants of that conference for their suggestions. Errors and omissions are 
of course my own. This article is based on developments as of September 2006 
and all websites were also last visited on that date. 
1 Address to the Federalist Society, 13 November 2003, http://www.fed-
soc.org/pdf/bolton.pdf, 19–20. 
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resolutions 1497 and 1593, the Security Council acted ultra vires, since no 
threat to the peace can be found in order to justify the exercise of 
Chapter VII powers. The resolutions are also in contrast with the principles 
and purposes of the UN. As to the bilateral non-surrender agreements, they 
cannot be qualified as “international agreements pursuant to which the 
consent of the sending State is required to surrender a person of that State 
to the Court” as required by Article 98 (2) of the Statute, since they 
prohibit the surrender to the ICC of any individual who is “present” on the 
territory of the other party and they do not require the state to which the 
accused has been transferred to investigate and prosecute the case. Should 
Italy conclude a non-surrender agreement with the US, it would incur 
international responsibility. The law giving effect to such an agreement in 
the Italian legal order would also be in contrast with Articles 10 (1) and 11 
of the Constitution. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well-known that, under Article 12 of the Rome Statute, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) can exercise its jurisdiction over 
nationals of non-party states if they have  committed the crime on the 
territory of a state party. However, Article 12 must be read in conjuction 
with Articles 16 and 98. The former provides that no investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with by the Court for a 
period of 12 months (renewable under the same conditions) after the 
Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect.2 Even if it 
 
2 The Rome Statute does not define what constitutes “investigation” or 
“prosecution”. The former comprises action that might be taken with respect to a 
situation and/or an individual, while “prosecution” includes only actions taken 
with regard to a specific person (Bergsmo and Pejić, “Article 16”, in Triffterer 
(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), 378). 
Furthermore, “prosecution” is a consequence of investigations. In any case, the 
borderline between the two concepts is not of paramount importance in the light 
of Art. 16, as both investigations and prosecutions are suspended by the request of 
the Security Council under Chapter VII. On the contrary, it is important to 
determine when the investigation commences: this happens “when the ICC 
prosecutor determines that there is a ‘reasonable basis to proceed’ and renders a 
decision to that effect” (Zeidy, “The United States Dropped the Atomic Bomb of 
Article 16 of the ICC Statute: Security Council Power of Deferrals and Resolution 
1422”, 35 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2002), 1513). Despite the 
Council’s request, the Prosecutor might still carry out preliminary activities which 
take place before the Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization (e.g., seeking information 
The Efforts To Limit The International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction 497 
 
 497
does not directly affect the ICC jurisdiction over a national of a non-party, 
Article 98 prevents a request by the Court of surrender or assistance 
whenever the requested state would have to act inconsistently with its 
obligations under international law with respect to the state or diplomatic 
immunity of a person or property of a third state or with its obligations 
under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending 
state is required to surrender a person of that state to the Court, unless the 
Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third state for the waiver of 
the immunity or the cooperation of the sending state for the giving of 
consent for the surrender.3 
The purpose of the present article is not a general discussion of the 
above mentioned provisions, but rather a comparative analysis of the 
efforts to use them to prevent the ICC from exercising its jurisdiction over 
nationals of states non-parties to the Statute. In particular, Articles 16 and 
98 have been employed by the current US administration as a Trojan 
Horse inside the complex and fragile legal structure created in Rome in 
1998 in order to paralyse it whenever US nationals are involved. 
 
from states, organs of intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, 
receiving written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court, analysing the 
information received) (Bergsmo and Pejić, supra note 2, 379). In case of a request 
not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution, the question arises of the 
preservation of evidence, which is not contemplated by the Statute. If the request 
of deferral is renewed for several years, the right of the accused to be tried 
without undue delay might also be violated  and the continued detention for the 
period of the deferral might be considered “arbitrary” (Condorelli and 
Villalpando, “Referral and Deferral by the Security Council”, in A. Cassese, 
Gaeta and Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2002), vol. I, 652–653). However, at least as far as 
the first problem is concerned, the case can be made that the preservation of 
evidence and the protection of witnesses and victims are not in constrast with the 
Security Council’s request of deferral, as they concern activities carried out before 
such request (ibid., at 651–652). 
3 The limits to the ICC requests provided in Art. 98 apply only in favour of 
nationals of states non-parties to the Statute (Akande, “The Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and 
Limits”, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 641). In effect, unlike 
the Security Council resolutions creating ad hoc judicial bodies, a treaty 
establishing an international court cannot remove the immunities of organs of 
states not parties to that treaty. 
498 Marco Roscini LPICT 2006 
The American government has played its game both at the multilateral 
and bilateral levels.4 As to the former, at the Rome Conference the 
 
4 The US objections to the ICC are well-known. The problem of the possible 
exercise of jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties is exacerbated by the fear 
that the Prosecutor might start proprio motu politically motivated proceedings 
against US citizens participating in military operations abroad. The US has also 
criticised the contrast between the Rome Statute and several provisions of its 
Constitution, in particular those providing for immunities of state officials and for 
the right to be tried by a jury (this position has been effectively criticised by 
Franck and Yuhan, “The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
Unilateralism Rampant”, 35 New York University Journal of International Law 
and Politics (2002–2003), 541–545). Finally, the inclusion of the crime of 
aggression, which might affect the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
in the maintenance of international peace and security and submit to judicial 
review states’ actions to protect their national security and their foreign policies 
has also been criticised. The risk highlighted by the US is that “senior United 
States officials may be at risk of criminal prosecution for national security 
decisions involving such matters as responding to act of terrorism, preventing the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and deterring aggression” 
(American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, section 2002, para. 9, on which see 
below, section IV of this article). On the US objections to the ICC see, more 
extensively, Hafner, “An Attempt to Explain the Position of the USA Towards the 
ICC”, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 323–332; Wedgwood, 
“The International Criminal Court: An American View”, 10 European Journal of 
International Law (1999), 93–107. However, this criticism is not convincing. The 
territoriality principle is contained in all national legislations as a ground for the 
exercise of jurisdiction by national tribunals: the ICC is quite simply the entity to 
which states parties to the Rome Statute have delegated the exercise of their 
respective territorial jurisdictions for certain crimes and under certain conditions 
(Stahn, “The Ambiguities of Security Council Resolution 1422 (2002)”, 14 
European Journal of International Law (2003), 86; Paust, “The Reach of ICC 
Jurisdiction Over Non-Signatory Nationals”, 33 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law (2000), 3–5, who recalls that, by establishing the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, states “have done together what any one of them might have done 
singly”). It is not helpful to argue that this delegation is unlawful as the exercise 
of jurisdiction is a fundamental prerogative of the state and thus inalienable: if a 
state can cede a part of its territory by treaty or even extinguish itself, a fortiori it 
will be able to delegate the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes 
to an international tribunal. Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides for effective 
safeguards against politically biased proceedings. Every decision of the 
Prosecutor to start proceedings must be authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber, 
which is composed of judges elected by a majority of two thirds of the members 
of the Assembly of States Parties. The Prosecutor can be removed from office by 
the Assembly of States Parties at any time (Art. 46). The Security Council might 
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negotiatiors sent by the then President Clinton tried to have the consent of 
the national state of the accused included among the preconditions for the 
ICC jurisdiction when the situation is not referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council.5 After the failure of this strategy, the offensive was 
launched by the George W. Bush administration in the UN Security 
Council and managed to secure the adoption of resolutions no. 1422 
(2002), 1487 (2003), 1497 (2003) and 1593 (2005).6 At the same time, the 
US government has pursued a campaign to dissuade states from ratifying 
the Rome Statute and to conclude bilateral agreements providing for the 
obligation not to surrender or by any means or purpose transfer to the ICC 
US officials, employees, personnel or nationals who are present on the 
territory of the other party without the expressed consent of the US. The 
present article first examines the US multilateral strategy by comparing the 
different Security Council resolutions which affect the ICC jurisdiction, 
and then discusses the bilateral non-surrender agreements. Finally, the 
legal consequences arising from the conclusion of such an agreement by 
Italy will be investigated, taking into account both Italy’s obligations 
under international law and the relevant provisions of its Constitution. 
II. THE MULTILATERAL STRATEGY: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 
NO. 1422 (2002), 1487 (2003), 1497 (2003) AND 1593 (2005) 
On 30 June 2002, when the Rome Statute was about to enter into force, the 
US declared that it would vote against a resolution renewing for 6 months 
the mandate of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 
and threatened to do the same with respect to all other UN peacekeeping 
operations if US military personnel participating in such operations were 
not granted an exemption from the ICC jurisdiction.7 The outcome of such 
 
also request the ICC not to commence or proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution under Art. 16. It is also worth recalling that under Art. 17 of the 
Statute the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction over a case only if the state party is 
“unwilling or unable” genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. 
Finally, the definition of the crime of aggression will have to be “consistent with 
the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” (Art. 5). 
5 Williams, “Article 12”, in Triffterer (ed.), supra note 2, at 336. 
6 The US has also opposed all reference to the ICC in Security Council 
resolutions. The only exceptions are resolution 1688 of 16 June 2006, which 
endorses the trial of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the 
ICC premises, and of course resolution 1593 of 2005. 
7 The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (below, section IV of this 
article) provides that “[e]ffective beginning on the date on which the Rome 
Statute enters into force […], the President should use the voice and vote of the 
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pressures was resolution no. 1422 of 12 July 2002, para. 1 of which 
provided that “consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, […] the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials 
or personnel from a contributing State not a party to the Rome Statute over 
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized 
operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not 
commence or proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case 
unless the Security Council decides otherwise”.8 The deferral of 
investigations and prosecutions could be renewed for further 12 months 
under the same conditions on 1 July of each year “as long as may be 
necessary” (para. 2), which punctually happened on 12 June 2003 with the 
adoption of resolution 1487.9 A proposal for a resolution providing for a 
further renewal was withdrawn by the US in June 2004, because of the 
opposition of the majority of the members of the Security Council and 
thanks to the lobbying of non-governmental organisations.10 
Resolution 1422 merely suspended the exercise of the ICC 
jurisdiction over officials or personnel from non-parties and did not 
prevent UN member states from prosecuting the crimes under the Rome 
Statute before their tribunals. One fails to see, though, why states could 
have exercised their jurisdiction separately but not jointly through the 
Court, which provides the defendant with better guarantees than those 
contained in the legislations of many countries.11 This contradiction has 
 
United States in the United Nations Security Council to ensure that each 
resolution of the Security Council authorizing any peacekeeping operation under 
chapter VI of the charter of the United Nations or peace enforcement operation 
under chapter VII of the charter of the United Nations permanently exempts, at a 
minimum, members of the Armed Forces of the United States participating in 
such operation from criminal prosecution by the International Criminal Court for 
actions undertaken by such personnel in connection with the operation” (section 
2005). 
8 The resolution was adopted unanimously, although certain members of the 
Security Council expressed their criticism. 
9 The resolution, which is identical to resolution 1422, was approved with 12 
votes in favour and none against, and the abstentions of France, Germany and 
Syria. 
10 The widespread outrage caused by the abuses suffered by the prisoners 
detained by US authorities in Afghanistan and Iraq probably played a major role 
in the failed renewal. 
11 Zappalà, “The Reaction of the US to the Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: 
Comments on UN SC Resolution 1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements”, 1 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 121. 
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been avoided in the subsequent resolutions. On 1 August 2003, the 
Security Council adopted resolution 1497, authorizing the establishment of 
a Multinational Force in Liberia in order to support the peace process in 
that country. Para. 7 provides that “current or former officials or personnel 
from a contributing state, which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 
of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or 
related to the Multinational Force or United Nations stabilization force in 
Liberia, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by 
that contributing state”. A similar paragraph has been included in 
resolution 1593 of 31 March 2005, by which the Security Council decided 
to refer the situation in Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor.12 
Unlike resolution 1422, the resolutions on Liberia and Sudan grant 
exclusive jurisdiction to the contributing state not party to the Rome 
Statute, thus excluding not only the jurisdiction of the ICC but also of any 
other state, including the state where the crime was committed, the state of 
nationality of the victim and any state which might be entitled to exercise 
universal jurisdiction.13 Accordingly, if a US member of the UN force 
killed an Italian citizen in Liberia, he/she might be only tried before US 
courts. If the crime were committed by a French, the traditional legal 
grounds of jurisdiction and the complementarity principle under Article 17 
 
12 According to para. 6 of the resolution, “nationals, current or former officials 
or personnel from a contributing State outside Sudan which is not a party to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out 
of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or 
the African Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived 
by that contributing State”. The inclusion of this paragraph constituted the price to 
pay in order to secure the abstention of the US in the vote. The US also asked and 
obtained that the costs arising from investigations in Darfur would not be met by 
the UN (para. 7). 
13 Some commentators have however suggested that resolution 1497 should be 
interpreted consistently with peremptory norms on the matter by, inter alia, 
interpreting the “exclusive” jurisdiction as “primary” jurisdiction: if the national 
state requests extradition, the forum deprehensionis state must comply, but if the 
national authorities of the contributing state do not investigate or prosecute the 
case, the jurisdiction of any other interested state would resurrect. Accordingly, 
extradition might be refused by the forum deprehensionis state if it bona fide 
appears that the national state will not conduct a genuine trial (or no trial at all) 
(A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 206–207; Zappalà, “Are 
Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 
(2003) and the ICC”, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 676). 
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of the Rome Statute would apply.14 It is worth noting that neither 
resolution 1497 nor resolution 1593 provide for the obligation of the 
contributing state non-party to the Rome Statute to exercise its jurisdiction 
over the accused: the exclusive jurisdiction might thus result in 
immunity.15 
There are also other differences between the resolutions under 
examination. The scope of application ratione personæ of the deferral of 
the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction provided by resolution 1422 and of the 
exclusive jurisdiction contained in resolution 1497 includes all current or 
former officials or personnel (both military and civilian) from a 
contributing state which is not a party to the Rome Statute (including 
nationals of states parties under the command or authority of a contributing 
state non-party), while the scope of application of para. 6 of resolution 
1593 is much broader: it includes not only “current or former officials or 
personnel”, but also any other national of states non-parties to the Statute 
(with the exception of Sudan) contributing to a mission established or 
authorized by the Security Council or the African Union in Sudan. For 
para. 6 to apply, then, there is no need that the person is (or was) in the 
employ of the state non-party, the nationality link being sufficient. 
On the other hand, the scope of application ratione materiæ of the 
three resolutions is identical and includes not only international crimes but 
also ordinary offences. However, there must be some link between the 
conduct and a peacekeeping operation or peacekeeping force. This is 
vague enough to cover acts or omissions committed by deserters or 
members of the force who are not any longer under its control. I do not 
share the opinion of those who argue that rape, forced prostitution or 
trafficking committed by members of the peacekeeping force could never 
be considered as “related” to the operation, as the commission of such 
crimes is not included in the mandate of the force.16 Indeed, under a literal 
 
14 The three resolutions under examination prevent the exercise of the ICC 
jurisdiction over nationals or personnel of all states non-parties to the Rome 
Statute, not just of the US. A state non-party not wishing that its personnel 
participating in a peacekeeping mission enjoy the permanent or temporary 
exemption by the ICC jurisdiction could only ask the Security Council to amend 
the resolutions and remove the exemption with regard to its nationals and 
personnel (Lavalle, “A Vicious Storm in a Teacup: The Action by the United 
Nations Security Council to Narrow the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court”, 14 Criminal Law Forum (2003), 215–216). 
15 Gaja, “Immunità squilibrate dalla giurisdizione penale in relazione 
all’intervento armato in Liberia”, 86 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2003), 763.  
16 Zappalà, supra note 13, 676. 
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interpretation of the resolutions under examination, the very fact that the 
conduct was carried out by a peacekeeper renders it “related” to the force 
or the operation, even if it does not fall within the mandate or has not been 
authorized by the UN. 
If resolution 1497 requires that acts or omissions arise out of or be 
related to a specific Force (the Multinational Force or UN stabilization 
force in Liberia), resolution 1422 and 1593 refer to any current or future 
operation established or authorized by the UN (or by the African Union in 
the case of resolution 1593).17 However, while resolution 1593 requires 
that the operation must be established or authorized specifically by the 
Security Council, resolution 1422 generically referred to the United 
Nations: even operations established by the General Assembly under the 
Uniting for Peace procedure might thus fall within its scope of 
application.18 Furthermore, if resolution 1593 only applies to operations 
deployed on Sudanese territory, resolution 1422 does not specify the place 
where the operation should be carried out. “United Nations established or 
authorized operation” includes both traditional peacekeeping operations, 
deployed with the consent of the territorial state with an interposition 
function, and the so-called peacekeeping operations of the second 
generation with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Regional multinational forces employed by the Security Council under its 
authority as provided in Article 53 of the UN Charter can also be included. 
The only operations which are not covered are those not established or 
authorized by the UN, whether lawful or not: actions in self-defence 
(Article 51 of the UN Charter) or by invitation of the legitimate 
government, but also operations which do not fall within the cases 
mentioned above and nevertheless have not been expressly authorized by 
the Security Council (such as Operation “Allied Force” carried out by 
NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999). The case has 
been made that this was a positive feature of resolution 1422, as states 
non-parties to the Rome Statute which intended to use force against 
another state would try to secure the Security Council’s authorization with 
more zeal, in order to make the resolution applicable and thus prevent the 
exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over their officials and personnel.19 
Nonetheless, this would result in the (mis)use of multilateral institutions in 
 
17 Para. 6 of resolution 1593 will thus apply to the UN peacekeeping force 
which should be deployed in Darfur according to Security Council resolution 
1706 of 31 August 2006. 
18 See General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950. 
19 Akande, supra note 3, 647. 
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order to implement unilateral strategies.20 What is more – as showed by the 
invasion of Iraq of March 2003 – the legal advisers of the intervening 
states would probably mantain the existence of an authorization, if 
implicit, by the Security Council, even at the cost of resorting to legal 
acrobatics. 
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE MULTILATERAL STRATEGY 
The request not to commence or proceed with investigations or 
prosecutions contained in resolution 1422 would have been binding on the 
ICC only if it would have fallen within the scope of Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.21 The opinion according to which Article 16 is unnecessary in this 
context because “the ‘acting under Chapter VII’ magic renders the 
[Security] Council all-powerful” is simply not correct.22 It is often 
forgotten that the UN Charter is still a treaty which binds only states 
parties. The ICC is instead an international organization with a legal 
personality on its own (Article 4 of the Rome Statute) and is not 
subordinated to the United Nations.23 Hence, neither Article 25 and 
Article 103 of the Charter nor the “Chapter VII magic” apply to it. The 
Security Council could adopt deferral requests binding on the ICC only if 
the Rome Statute so provides, as in the case of Article 16.24 
 
20 The so-called “multilateral hegemonism” (Tanzi, Introduzione al diritto 
internazionale contemporaneo (Padova: CEDAM, 2006), 23–24). 
21 It would have been up to the ICC itself to incidentally establish the legality 
of resolution 1422 both with regard to the UN Charter and to the Rome Statute 
during a proceeding before it, even though the Security Council seemed to have 
already unilaterally determined that resolution 1422 was “consistent with Article 
16” (para. 1). See Deen-Racsmány, “The ICC, Peacekeepers and Resolution 1422: 
Will the Court Defer to the Council?”, 49 Netherlands International Law Review 
(2002), 381–386. 
22 This opinion is argued by Lavalle, supra note 14, 206, 210, 212–213. 
23 This has led to the conclusion of a relationship agreement between the two 
organizations, entered into force in October 2004. Art. 2 (1) provides that the 
United Nations “recognises the Court as an independent permanent judicial 
institution which […] has international legal personality”, while para. 3 of the 
same provision provides that “[t]he United Nations and the Court respect each 
other’s status and mandate” (the text can be read at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-3-Res1_English.pdf). 
24 In any case, it has been noted that, by referring to Art. 16 in para. 1 of 
resolution 1422, the Security Council itself accepted to exercise its powers within 
the limits permitted by the Rome Statute, renouncing to invoke the primacy of the 
UN Charter (Zappalà, supra note 11, 119; Lattanzi, “La Corte penale 
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Both the contextual interpretation and the travaux préparatoires of 
Article 16 clearly show that this provision was not conceived to cover 
future and hypothetical cases, but rather specific situations where the 
exercise of the ICC jurisdiction might prejudice the Security Council’s 
efforts to maintain international peace and security.25 Furthermore, like all 
exceptions, Article 16 should be narrowly construed. On the contrary, 
resolution 1422 re-interpreted Article 16 and provided for the deferral of 
the ICC jurisdiction “if a case arises”, without reference to any concrete 
situations. In fact, at the time the resolution was adopted, the Court had not 
yet become operative and the prosecution of US citizens was not in the 
least foreseeable. As observed by the representative of Canada to the UN, 
this would set a dangerous precedent under which the Council could 
change the negotiated terms of any treaty it wished.26 It is however 
questionable that the Security Council can amend or re-interpret a treaty. 
All it can do is call on member states to act inconsistently with their treaty 
obligations if it is necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security: this is not technically “amendment”, but rather a temporary and 
reversible interference in the operation of treaties.27 
For the same reasons, and even though it is mentioned in the 
preamble, Article 16 of the Rome Statute cannot be a legal basis for 
 
internazionale: una sfida per le giurisdizioni degli Stati”, 4 Diritto pubblico 
comparato ed europeo (2002), 1372). 
25 Stahn, supra note 4, 88–91; Deen-Racsmány, supra note 21, 364–366. In 
particular, it has been maintained that Articles 13-15 all refer to situations where 
crimes under the Rome Statute have been committed or might have been 
committed, and the inclusion of Art. 16 after these provisions means that it covers 
similar scenarios (see, for a different view, Elias and Quast, “The Relationship 
Between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court in the Light of 
Resolution 1422 (2002)”, 3 Non-State Actors and International Law (2003), 176). 
In the debates in the Security Council, most states supported this interpretation 
and criticised the adoption of resolutions 1422 and 1487 (Coulée, “Sur un Etat 
tiers bien peu discret: les Etats-Unis confrontés au Statut de la Cour pénale 
internationale”, 49 Annuaire français de droit international (2003), 54–56). On 
the travaux préparatoires of Art. 16, see Bergsmo and Pejić, supra note 2, 373–
378. 
26 S/PV.4568, 10 July 2002, at 3. As noted by Condorelli and Villalpando, “the 
intention to exclude any modification of the Court’s jurisdiction by this UN organ 
is manifest in all the provisions concerning the amendment and review of the 
Statute” (“Can the Security Council Extend the ICC’s Jurisdiction?”, in 
A. Cassese, Gaeta and Jones (eds.), supra note 2, 574). 
27 Lavalle, supra note 14, 205. 
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resolution 1593.28 From a strictly logical point of view, it would also be 
hard to reconcile the Security Council’s decision to refer the situation in 
Sudan to the Prosecutor with the qualification of the exercise of the 
jurisdiction of the Court (and of all states apart from the state of the 
accused) over the peacekeepers of states non-parties as a threat to the 
peace.29 
All the three resolutions under examination have been adopted by the 
Security Council invoking Charter VII of the UN Charter. This was 
essential for resolution 1422, which expressly ascribed itself to Article 16 
of the Rome Statute: according to this provision, the Council’s request to 
the Court not to commence or proceed with investigations or prosecutions 
must be contained in a resolution adopted under Charter VII. It seems that 
the only Charter provision under which the Security Council could take 
action under Article 16 is Article 41, which provides for measures short of 
the use of armed force.30 The point, though, is not of paramount 
importance, as it is very much in vogue in the Security Council practice to 
invoke Chapter VII as a whole as the legal basis for its resolutions. 
Be that as it may, the fundamental pre-requisite for the exercise of 
Chapter VII powers by the Security Council is the existence of a threat to 
the peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression and the Council’s 
determination that one of those situations exists (Article 39 of the UN 
Charter). Nonetheless, neither a breach of peace nor an act of aggression 
had been committed in the context of the situation where resolution 1422 
was adopted. As to a threat to the peace, it is a truism that this concept is a 
vague one and that the Council enjoys a broad margin of appreciation 
when determining its content. The threat to the peace might have been 
constituted by the exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over personnel 
participating in missions established or authorized by the UN, but this 
would be tantamount to argue that the prosecution of international crimes 
is in contrast with the maintenance of international peace and security and 
that the former can be realized only by sacrificing the latter and vice 
 
28 Cryer, “Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice”, 19 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), 211; Happold, “Darfur, the Security 
Council, and the International Criminal Court”, 55 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (2006), 232. 
29 Condorelli and Ciampi, “Comments on the Security Council Referral of the 
Situation in Darfur to the ICC”, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 
(2005), 596. It is also doubtful whether Art. 16 applies to proceedings triggered 
by the Security Council itself. 
30 Lavalle, supra note 14, 201. 
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versa.31 This situation could only occur in a specific and existing context, 
for instance when the ICC Prosecutor intends to start proceedings against 
the leader of a state with whom a peace agreement is being negotiated. 
Only if such a situation has been identified could the Security Council 
resort to Article 16. Furthermore, if it were true that the ICC interferences 
in the peacekeepers’ activities are by definition a threat to the peace, it 
would be difficult to explain why the request of deferral contained in 
resolution 1422 was limited to proceedings against nationals of non-
parties, and not also of states parties.32 Another possible explanation is that 
the threat to the peace was the failed renewal of the peacekeeping 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: however, this would make sense 
only if resolution 1422 itself provided for the extension of the UNMIBH 
mandate, which was instead contained in another resolution.33 Finally, the 
threat to the peace might have been constituted by the US refusal to 
participate in the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and/or by the threat 
to use its veto power against the extension of this and other operations.34 
This seems to be suggested by the preamble of resolution 1422, according 
to which “it is in the interests of international peace and security to 
facilitate Member States’ ability to contribute to operations established or 
authorized by the United Nations Security Council”. But this conclusion 
would also be illogical, because, if adopted to face such situation, the 
resolution would have favoured the state responsible of the threat, rather 
 
31 On the contrary, the preamble of the Rome Statute recalls that the crimes 
under the Statute “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”. 
According to Condorelli and Villalpando, the ICC was inspired by the “conviction 
that the prosecution of major international crimes constitutes a means to the 
maintenance of international peace and security” (supra note 2, 627). As Sarooshi 
notes, “[i]t is somewhat simplistic to counterpose the achievement of justice as 
being a distinct matter from the achievement of peace in a war-torn society”, as 
well-illustrated “by the approach of the Security Council to the conflict in the 
Former Yugoslavia where it decided in resolution 827 to establish the ICTY as a 
contribution to the restoration of peace” (Sarooshi, “The Peace and Justice 
Paradox: The International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council”, in 
McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal 
Court (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2004), 105). 
32 Arcari, “La risoluzione 1422 (2002) relativa ai rapporti tra Corte penale 
internazionale e forze di peacekeeping: (nuovi) problemi di legittimità dell’azione 
del Consiglio di sicurezza”, 85 Rivista di diritto internazionale (2002), 728. 
33 Resolution 1423 of 12 July 2002. 
34 Zappalà, supra note 11, 118-119; Deen-Racsmány, supra note 21, 380–381, 
according to whom the Security Council determined implicitly the existence of a 
threat to the peace. 
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than sanctioning it.35 The US threat of the veto was instead an abuse of the 
right set forth in Article 27 of the Charter and of the duty to fulfil in good 
faith the obligations contained in the Charter and to cooperate with the 
Organization (Article 2). 
Resolutions 1497 and 1593 have also been adopted by the Security 
Council acting under Charter VII of the Charter. The threat to the peace 
justifying their adoption is identified in the situations in Liberia and Sudan. 
If they certainly justify the deployment of a multinational force and the 
referral to the ICC Prosecutor, it is hard to understand how those situations 
can be a valid basis for the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing states 
non-parties to the Rome Statute. As observed by one commentator, the 
paragraph providing for exclusive jurisdiction “does not share the rationale 
behind the rest of the resolution[s] and […] the threat to peace which 
constitutes the underpinning of Chapter VII powers and of resolution 1497 
(2003) [and of resolution 1593 (2005)] does not cover or extend to 
operative paragraph 7 [and to paragraph 6]”.36 
Even charitably assuming that a threat to the peace does exist, the 
Security Council must still exercise its powers within the purposes and 
principles enshrined in the Charter.37 The case can well be made that the 
resolutions under examination conflict with the purposes to bring about “in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law” the 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace, and of “promoting and encouraging 
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (Article 1). The 
resolutions are also in contrast with the principle of the sovereign equality 
of states and with the principle according to which international disputes 
shall be settled “by peaceful means in such a manner that […] justice [is] 
not endangered” (Article 2). 
From the above considerations, it follows that resolution 1422, para. 7 
of resolution 1497 and para. 6 of resolution 1593 are not binding on UN 
member states, as Article 25 of the UN Charter provides that members 
“agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in 
 
35 It would rather seem that it is the ICC which was sanctioned by the 
resolution. 
36 Zappalà, supra note 13, 675. 
37 Art. 24 (2) of the Charter provides that the Security Council “shall act in 
accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. See 
Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić, ICTY, Case no. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, 
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
2 October 1995, paras. 28–29. 
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accordance with the present Charter”.38 Consequently, Article 103 is also 
not applicable, because it only provides for the prevalence of the 
“obligations” arising from the Charter over other agreements.39 Not being 
ascribable to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the resolutions under 
examination are not binding on the ICC either. 
IV. THE BILATERAL STRATEGY: ARTICLE 98 (2) OF THE ROME STATUTE 
AND THE NON-SURRENDER AGREEMENTS  
Both resolution 1422 (2002) and the resolutions on Liberia and Sudan 
shield nationals and personnel of states non-parties to the Rome Statute 
from the ICC jurisdiction (and, as far as the latter resolutions are 
concerned, from the jurisdiction of any state apart from that of the 
accused) only with regard to acts or omissions arising out of or related to 
an operation established or authorized by the UN. In order to cover all 
other cases, the US has launched a campaign for the conclusion of bilateral 
agreements to exempt its nationals from the ICC jurisdiction. These 
agreements have been concluded both with states non-parties to the Rome 
Statute and with states which have ratified it.40 If concluded with a non-
party, the agreements set forth the reciprocal obligation not to surrender or 
by any means or purpose transfer each other’s nationals, officials, 
employees or military personnel to the ICC or to any other entity or third 
country, or to expel them to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to 
or transfer to the ICC, without the expressed consent of the state party of 
nationality or of employ. The prohibition to surrender or transfer “by any 
means” and “for any purpose” results in the impossibility to hand over to 
 
38 Italics added. Accordingly, all UN member states apart from those which 
have acquiesced could validly challenge the legality of the resolutions under 
examination and refuse to give effect to them (Conforti, The Law and Practice of 
the United Nations (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 310-311). 
39 Bernhardt, “Article 103”, in Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2002), volume II, 1299. 
40 See, for instance, the agreements concluded by the US with Uzbekistan on 
18 September 2002 (42 International Legal Materials (2003), 39–40) and East 
Timor on 23 August 2002 (97 American Journal of International Law (2003), 
201–202; the Asian country ratified the Rome Statute two weeks after concluding 
the non-surrender agreement). According to the US Department of State, about 
100 countries have signed bilateral non-surrender agreements (August 2006). 
However, only 39 are currently in force (source: 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS_BIAstatus_current.pdf). 
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The Hague even those who should only be heard as witnesses.41 If the 
agreement has been concluded with a state which has signed or ratified the 
Rome Statute, the obligation not to surrender or transfer is not reciprocal 
and is provided only in favour of US nationals, officials, employees and 
military personnel. The non-surrender agreements with a state which has 
not ratified the Rome Statute further provide that when a state party to the 
agreement extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the 
other party to a third country, it will not agree to the surrender or transfer 
of that person to the ICC by the third country, absent the expressed consent 
of the state party of nationality or of employ.42 
The non-surrender agreements are usually concluded with states 
sensitive to the US pressures, either because they depend on its military 
and economic assistance or because they aspire to becoming members of 
organizations such as NATO.43 On 2 August 2002, President Bush signed 
the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act (ASPA), which, apart from 
prohibiting any form of cooperation and financing of the ICC by US 
agencies or entities (section 2004), cancels Washington’s military 
assistance to countries which have ratified the Rome Statute and have not 
concluded a non-surrender agreement (section 2007).44 The Act also limits 
 
41 Fornari, “Corte penale internazionale, Stati Unity e impunity agreements”, 
58 La Comunità internazionale (2003), 255. 
42 The non-surrender agreements provide for no final term: they remain in 
force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of its intent 
to terminate it. In this case, the provisions of the non-surrender agreement 
continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, 
before the effective date of termination. 
43 The non-surrender agreements cannot however be considered vitiated by 
coercion: it is well-known that Art. 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties only refers to the threat or use of armed force. The prominent position of 
one party and the disproportionality of the obligations assumed, even in the case 
of reciprocal non-surrender agreements, has led one commentator to qualify them 
as unequal treaties similar to the capitulations regime (Coulée, supra note 25, 60–
61). The mere unequality of the obligations assumed or of the position of the 
parties, however, does not per se vitiate the treaty. 
44 The ASPA can be read at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/othr/misc/23425.htm. The prohibition of military 
assistance can be waived if this is justified by the US national interest (section 
2007 (b)). On 21 November 2003, the waiver was for the first time exercised with 
regard to states refusing to conclude a non-surrender agreement (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia) in order to favour their 
integration into NATO or to support Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom. On 29-30 September 2006, the US House of Representatives and 
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the US participation in UN peacekeeping operations to cases where: a) the 
Security Council has permanently exempted, at a minimum, members of 
the US armed forces participating in the operation from criminal 
prosecution or other assertion of jurisdiction by the ICC for actions 
undertaken by them in connection with the operation; b) the country in 
which members of the US armed forces are present either is not a party to 
the ICC and has not invoked the ICC jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12 of 
the Rome Statute, or has entered into an agreement in accordance with 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute; c) it is in the national interests of the 
United States to participate in the peacekeeping or peace enforcement 
operation (section 2005).45 The weirdest provision is perhaps section 2008, 
according to which the President can use “all means necessary and 
appropriate to bring about the release” of covered US and allied persons 
detained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the ICC: it is 
 
the US Senate respectively passed an amendment which repeals the section of the 
ASPA that restricts International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds 
to ICC states parties that have refused to sign a non-surrender agreement. In a 
separate but simultaneous move, on 2 October 2006, the White House announced 
that President Bush had issued waivers to end prohibitions on IMET aid for 21 
ICC states parties who have not signed a non-surrender agreement 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/uslatest/story/0,,-6121333,00.html). However, both of 
these recent measures only restore IMET funding, leaving in place the 
withholding of both foreign military funds under ASPA and economic support 
funds under the Nethercutt Amendment. It has also been reported that, due to the 
growing Chinese influence in the region, the White House is currently evaluating 
a change in its bilateral strategy against Latin American countries not willing to 
sign a non-surrender agreement with the US, but it is not clear whether aid cuts 
will be cancelled to all countries or just to some 
(http://www.elmostrador.cl/modulos/noticias/constructor/noticia_new.asp?id_noti
cia=191098). On the ASPA, see Faulhaber, “American Servicemembers’ 
Protection Act of 2002”, 40 Harvard Journal on Legislation (2003), 537–557. 
45 Section 2015 of ASPA also provides that “[n]othing in this title shall 
prohibit the United States from rendering assistance to international efforts to 
bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, Osama bin Laden, other 
members of Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals 
accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity”. It is to be noted that 
the ASPA only refers to agreements preventing the ICC from prosecuting US 
personnel (section 2007 (c)), while – as we will see – the non-surrender 
agreements have a much broader scope of application ratione personæ. 
Furthermore, the ASPA only applies to the relationship with the ICC and not with 
the ad hoc international criminal tribunals established by the Security Council 
(section 2004). 
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doubtful whether this provision (dubbed “Hague invasion clause”) 
constitutes a threat to the use of force in contrast with Article 2 (4) of the 
UN Charter.46 On 7 December 2004, President Bush also signed the 
Nethercutt Amendment to the US Foreign Appropriations Act, which 
prohibits economic assistance (including programs against drug trafficking 
and promotion of human rights) to states parties to the Rome Statute which 
have refused to conclude a non-surrender agreement.47 However, the 
President can waive the prohibition of providing funds with respect to 
NATO member states, other major allies such as Australia, Egypt, Israel, 
Japan, Jordan, Argentina, South Korea, New Zealand and Taiwan, and any 
other states if it is in the US national interests to do so.48 
According to the US, the legal basis for the non-surrender agreements, 
which assures the compatibility with the Rome Statute, is Article 98 (2) of 
the Statute itself.49 The achievement of the purpose of the Statute (to rule 
out impunity for those responsible of international crimes) is in fact subject 
to certain limitations set forth in Article 98. In particular, para. 2 of this 
provision provides that “[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for 
surrender which would call on the requested State to act inconsistently 
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the 
consent of the sending State is required to surrender a person of that State 
to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the 
sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender”. Article 98 (2) 
imposes an obligation on the ICC (not to proceed with a request of 
surrender under Article 89 (1) of the Statute) and does not per se require 
states parties not to conclude agreements prohibiting the surrender of 
individuals to the Court. Hence, if the non-surrender agreements were 
ascribable to those described in Article 98 (2), states parties to the Rome 
Statute and to such agreements would not be obliged to comply with a 
request of surrender by the Court, as this – without the consent of the 
sending state - would be in violation of the Statute.50 
 
46 The ASPA has been criticized, among others, by the European Parliament 
(P5_TA(2002)0367, 4 July 2002). 
47 Text at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Nethercutt%202006.pdf. 
48 In addition, the prohibition of financial assistance does not apply to states 
eligible for assistance under the 2003 Millennium Challenge Act. The Nethercutt 
amendment has been renewed for the fiscal year 2006.  
49 See J.R. Bolton, supra note 1, 15. 
50 It is up to the ICC to determine whether a certain agreement is covered by 
Art. 98 (2) in a proceeding before it. Should it establish that Art. 98 (2) applies, 
the Court should not proceed with the request of surrender. On the contrary, if 
Art. 98 (2) is not applicable and the state party persisted in not complying with a 
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Article 98 (2) generically refers to international agreements “pursuant 
to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of 
that State to the Court”. Nonetheless, the travaux préparatoires of the 
provision suggest that it was conceived to cover the Status of Forces 
Agreements (SOFAs) and the extradition agreements concluded by states 
parties to the Rome Statute.51 The literal interpretation of the provision 
 
request of surrender under Art. 89 (1), the ICC might make a finding to that effect 
and refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security 
Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council (Art. 87 (7)). The 
settlement of disputes mechanism provided in Art. 119 of the Rome Statute would 
also apply. The fact that resolution 1593, by which the Security Council has 
referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC Prosecutor, mentions the non-surrender 
agreements concluded by the US in the preamble does not have any consequences 
on the matter, since the resolution confines itself to “take note” of the existence of 
such agreements (see the statement of the representative of Denmark following 
the voting on the resolution: UN Doc S/PV.5158, 31 March 2005, at 6). The 
inclusion of such reference is a however political success for the US (Condorelli 
and Ciampi, supra note 29, 598). 
51 See Scheffer, “Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America’s Original 
Intent”, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005), 333–353; Nigro, 
“Corte penale internazionale e accordi bilaterali diretti a precludere agli Stati parti 
la consegna di presunti criminali”, 58 La Comunità internazionale (2003), 623–
629; Prost and Schlunck, “Article 98”, in Triffterer (ed.), supra note 2, 1133. 
According to Amnesty International, Art. 98 (2) only refers to agreements 
concluded before the Rome Statute entered into force (International Criminal 
Court: US Efforts to Obtain Impunity for Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, 
and War Crimes, AI Index: IOR 40/025/2002, August 2002, 5–17). Nonetheless, 
the ordinary meaning of Art. 98, which omits reference to “existing” international 
obligations and simply refers to “obligations under international agreements”, 
does not allow to rule out with certainty agreements concluded after 1 July 2002. 
Indeed, when the Statute has intended to refer only to existing agreements, it has 
said so expressly: see Articles 90 (6) and 93 (3), also included in Part 9 
(Crawford, Sands and Wilde, In the Matter of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court and in the Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United 
States Under Article 98(2) of the Statute, Joint Opinion, at 18 
(http://www.iccnow.org/documents/SandsCrawfordBIA14June03.pdf)). But see, 
contra, Benzing, “U.S. Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements and Article 98 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Exercise in the Law of Treaties”, 8 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (2004), 219; Mori, “Gli accordi di 
esenzione ex art. 98 dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale”, 86 Rivista di 
diritto internazionale (2003), 1015; Kaul and Kreß, “Jurisdiction and Cooperation 
in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Principles and Compromises”, 2 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (1999), 164–165. 
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seems to uphold this view: the expression “sending state” employed in 
Article 98 (2) also appears in the SOFAs to indicate the state dispatching 
the forces and in the extradition agreements to mean the extraditing state.52 
The SOFAs allow the forces of a state to station on the territory of another 
state and regulate their respective jurisdictions. In most cases, the “sending 
state” has exclusive or primary jurisdiction over its civilian and military 
personnel when they are serving abroad.53 The receiving state which is also 
 
52 This wording is also employed in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic 
(1961) and Consular (1963) Relations. 
53 The SOFAs are usually modelled on the London Agreement of 19 June 1951 
between the NATO member states, Art. VII (2) of which provides for the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the sending state or of the receiving state for conduct 
criminalized by the law of one country but not of the other (the text can be read in 
Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 
561–574). When the jurisdiction is concurrent, the sending state has primary 
criminal jurisdiction over military members and civilian components of the force 
with regards to: (a) offences solely against the property or security of that state, or 
offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or 
civilian component of that state or of a dependent; (b) offences arising out of any 
act or omission done in the performance of official duty. In any other case, the 
authorities of the receiving state have primary jurisdiction over the offence (Art. 
VII (3)). Hence, if a member of the US armed forces committed a crime under the 
ICC jurisdiction abroad in the performance of official duty and the territorial state 
had concluded a SOFA, the US would have the primary right to exercise 
jurisdiction over the case and the territorial state should transfer the accused to the 
US authorities. If the state having primary jurisdiction decides not to exercise it, it 
must notify its decision to the authorities of the other state as soon as possible. 
Finally, the authorities of the state having primary jurisdiction “shall give 
sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a 
waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of 
particular importance” (Art. VII (3) (c)). Some SOFAs (such as those with Tonga 
and the Philippines) partly differ from the London Agreement model, as they 
provide that, at the US request, these countries will waive their primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction (the waiver may be revoked if the case is of particular 
importance) (Rosenfeld, “Application of U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to 
Article 98 of the Rome Statute”, 2 Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review (2003), 288). 
The ad hoc agreements concluded between the UN, the contributing states and the 
territorial state with regard to UN peacekeeping operations must also be 
distinguished from traditional SOFAs (Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for 
Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594 (9 October 1990), published in 
Fleck (ed.), supra note 53, 603–614). Such agreements provide for a jurisdiction 
of the contributing state broader than that of the sending state under the NATO 
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party to the Rome Statute could thus be required by a SOFA to transfer the 
accused to the sending state and at the same time to surrender him/her to 
the ICC under Articles 86 et seq. of the Rome Statute (if it is a crime under 
the ICC jurisdiction). Article 98 (2) was included exactly to avoid such 
situations: the consent of the sending state must first be obtained before the 
ICC can proceed with a request of surrender.54 As to extradition 
agreements, they usually contain a provision submitting to the consent of 
the extraditing state the transfer of an extraditee by the requesting state to a 
third state. If an individual accused of a crime under the Rome Statute has 
been extradited by a state non-party to a state party to the Statute under an 
agreement which submits re-extradition to the consent of the extraditing 
 
SOFAs: in effect, they provide for the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the 
contributing state over any crime committed by the military members of the 
military component of the force and for immunity from legal process only for acts 
performed in an official capacity in the other cases (paras. 46 et seq.). The 
exclusive jurisdiction of the participating state is also provided for multinational 
operations outside the UN system, like IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia and ISAF in 
Afghanistan (Zwanenburg, “The Statute for an International Criminal Court and 
the United States: Peacekeepers Under Fire?”, 10 European Journal of 
International Law (1999), 127–129). The preamble of the SOFA drafted by the 
European Union with regard to operations under Art. 17 (2) of the EU Treaty 
provides that “the rights and obligations of the parties under international 
agreements and other international instruments establishing international 
tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, will 
remain unaffected” (the text of the agreement is available at 
http://www.difesa.it/backoffice/upload/allegati/2005/%7B9086B8BC-E2DB-
4BE3-81FE-D1BC91210147%7D.pdf). The inclusion of such a clause is not 
surprising, as all EU member states have either signed or ratified the Rome 
Statute. 
54 According to some commentators, however, the SOFAs do not fall within 
the scope of application of Art. 98 (2), as they do not submit the surrender of the 
accused to the sending state’s consent, but confine themselves to define the 
jurisdiction of the sending and receiving states (Fleck, “Are Foreign Military 
Personnel Exempt from International Criminal Jurisdiction Under Status of Force 
Agreements?”, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003), 656; Paust, 
supra note 4, 14). Furthermore, an international crime would never qualify as “an 
act or omission done in the performance of official duty” (Paust, supra note 4, 10–
11). Finally, the SOFAs do not mention “the Court”, as required by Art. 98 (2) 
(ibid., at 14). These opinions, though, are not supported by the travaux 
preparatoires of Art. 98. Moreover, as suggested by Akande, the prohibition of 
surrender without the sending state’s consent is implicit in the SOFAs (Akande, 
supra note 3, 644). 
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state, under Article 98 (2) the ICC cannot request his/her surrender if it has 
not first secured the consent of the extraditing state.55 
The SOFAs and the extradition agreements are consistent with the 
object and purpose of the Rome Statute, since they do not provide for 
immunity, but rather ensure that one state – be it the sending/extraditing 
state or the receiving/requesting state – will exercise its jurisdiction if the 
other does not: the mechanism is thus similar to the principle of 
complementarity which is the basis of the ICC jurisdiction.56 However, 
there are several remarkable differences between the SOFAs and the non-
surrender agreements concluded by the US. The scope of application 
ratione personæ of the latter includes “current or former government 
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or 
nationals of one Party”, while the former only apply to current members of 
military forces and to civilians in the employ of an armed service of the 
sending state. The scope of application ratione personæ of the non-
surrender agreements is also broader than that of resolutions 1422 and 
1497, as it includes, like resolution 1593, nationals present on the territory 
of the other party in a private capacity. It is difficult to reconcile this 
approach with Article 98 (2), which requires the existence of a “sending 
state”: it is not enough that the individual is a national of the concerned 
state, as he/she must somehow be “sent” abroad on the basis of an official 
act.57 If the drafters of the Rome Statute had intended a different meaning, 
they would have employed the expression “state of nationality” and not 
“sending state”. Individuals who have not been “sent” could thus only be 
covered by Article 98 (1) if the conditions provided in this provision are 
met: an example could be a Prime Minister on a private visit abroad.58 
 
55 On the contrary, if the extraditing state and the state requiring extradition are 
both parties to the Rome Statute, they are called upon not to hinder the re-
extradition (rectius: surrender) to the ICC. 
56 Wirth, “Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute”, 
12 Criminal Law Forum (2001), 455–456. The problem is not whether those 
accused of international crimes should be prosecuted, but by whom (Zappalà, 
supra note 11, 116). 
57 Mori, supra note 51, 1027. On the contrary, the US interprets the words 
“sending state” as “state with which the individuals have some connection”, thus 
including both the state dispatching the personnel participating in the operation 
(regardless of their nationality) and the state of nationality (regardless of its 
official capacity) (Scheffer, supra note 51, 346, 348). There might be ambiguous 
cases, such as students abroad on a governmental cultural exchange program. 
58 It is to be noted that Art. 98 (2) generically refers to “international agreements 
between the sending State and the requested State that create international 
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The second difference between the SOFAs covered by Article 98 (2) 
and the non-surrender agreements is that, according to the preamble of the 
latter, the US “expressed its intention” to investigate and prosecute acts 
within the ICC jurisdiction committed by its officials, employees, military 
personnel or nationals only “where appropriate”, while the exclusive 
jurisdiction provided in the former is based on the assumption that the 
sending state will prosecute the accused after he/she has been transferred 
to it. Article 98 was never intended to allow agreements that would 
preclude the possibility of a trial by the ICC where the sending state did 
not exercise jurisdiction over the case: such an interpretation of Article 98 
would contradict Article 27 of the Rome Statute, which provides that no 
official capacity whatsoever can exempt from the ICC jurisdiction. Indeed, 
the absence in the non-surrender agreements of an obligation to exercise 
jurisdiction raises the danger that the accused might not be tried at all: it is 
worth remembering that under US law crimes against humanity (apart 
from torture) and many crimes of war committed abroad are not federal 
offences, and genocide can be prosecuted only if the accused is a US 
national or the crime has been committed on US territory.59 The conclusion 
of an agreement which immunizes a person from prosecution at either 
international or national level would not be compatible with the obligation 
not to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and with the 
obligation to perform the treaty in good faith.60 In effect, the realization of 
the purpose (to put an end to impunity for those accused of international 
crimes through the application of the principle of complementarity) 
depends on the fact that states exercise their jurisdiction over ICC crimes 
or otherwise cooperate with the Court according to Part 9, as the Statute 
 
obligations for the requested State”. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and the 1960 New York Convention on Special Missions also fall 
within this category, which determines a partial overlap of paras. 1 and 2 of Art. 
98 (Akande, “International Law Immunities and the International Criminal 
Court”, 98 American Journal of International Law (2004), 428). 
59 Amnesty International, supra note 51, 21. On the consistency of US law with 
the Rome Statute, see Hatchell, “Closing the Gaps in United States Law and 
Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach”, 12 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (2005), 183–252. 
60 Also States which have only signed the Statute must refrain from acts which 
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty (Article 18 of the Vienna 
Convention). 
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prohibits trials in absentia: the conclusion of a non-surrender agreement 
would prejudice this cooperation, at least as far as surrender is concerned.61 
States parties to the Rome Statute (and/or to conventions providing 
for the aut dedere aut judicare principle62) which conclude a non-surrender 
agreement with the US might also incur international responsibility for the 
assumption of competing obligations (Article 30 (5) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties).63 Indeed, both obligations would be 
validly assumed and the treaty to which both states are parties would 
govern their mutual rights and obligations (Art. 30 (4) (b)). Accordingly, if 
the state party to the Rome Statute does not comply with an ICC request of 
surrender of a US national, official, or employee, it would commit an 
international wrongful act towards the ICC and the other parties. On the 
other hand, if it surrenders the accused to the ICC, it would incur 
international responsibility towards the US. 
The conclusion of a non-surrender agreement by a state party to the 
Rome Statute would not authorize the other parties to do likewise: Article 
60 (5) of the Vienna Convention provides that states cannot terminate or 
suspend the operation of provisions relating to the protection of the human 
person contained in treaties of a humanitarian character as a consequence 
of its breach by another party.64 However, any state party could always 
invoke the right to withdraw from the Statute provided for in Article 127. 
There is no express obligation to motivate the withdrawal, which must be 
addressed by written notification to the UN Secretary-General and takes 
effect one year after the receipt of the notification, unless a later date is 
specified. Apart from remedies under customary international law, the only 
other measure available to the parties against the state which has 
concluded a non-surrender agreement after ratifying the Rome Statute 
would be that provided by Article 119 (2) of the Rome Statute, according 
 
61 Van der Wilt, “Bilateral Agreements Between the United States and States 
Parties to the Rome Statute: Are They Compatible with the Object and Purpose of 
the Statute?”, 18 Leiden Journal of International Law (2005), 100. 
62 Zappalà, supra note 11, 124, 130. 
63 Art. 30 (2) does not apply in the present case: the reference to Art. 98 
contained in the preamble of the US non-surrender agreements cannot be 
interpreted as a subordination clause with respect to the Rome Statute. 
64 Art. 60 (5) must be interpreted as referring to all human rights treaties, not 
only to humanitarian ones (Treves, Diritto internazionale. Problemi fondamentali 
(Milano: Giuffrè, 2005), 428). The conclusion of a non-surrender agreement 
could well be qualified as a material breach, which, according to Art. 60, consists, 
inter alia, in “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the 
object or purpose of the treaty”. 
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to which “[a]ny other dispute between two or more States Parties relating 
to the interpretation or application of this Statute which is not settled 
through negotiations within three months of their commencement shall be 
referred to the Assembly of States Parties”. The Assembly “may itself seek 
to settle the dispute or may make recommendations on further means of 
settlement of the dispute, including referral to the International Court of 
Justice in conformity with the Statute of that Court”.65 
V. THE BILATERAL STRATEGY AND ITALY 
Italy has been under pressure for the conclusion of a non-surrender 
agreement with the US.66 The possibility that Italy surrendered to 
Washington’s requests was not linked to the cancellation of economic or 
military aid,67 but rather to the pro-American enthousiasm of the 
Berlusconi administration. The conclusion of a non-surrender agreement 
would however be criticizable from several points of view. As shown 
above, Italy would breach its obligation to perform the Rome Statute in 
good faith and not to defeat its object and purpose. Furthermore, Italy 
could incur international responsibility for the assumption of competing 
obligations (Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
The non-surrender agreement would conflict not only with the Rome 
Statute, but also  with other international obligations binding on Italy, such 
as Article VI of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide,68 Article 49 (2) of the I Geneva Convention the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, Article 50 (2) of the II Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Article 129 of the III Geneva 
 
65 The ICC could also settle any dispute concerning its judicial functions as 
provided for in Article 119 (1) of the Statute. 
66 See “The European Union, the United States and the International Criminal 
Court, Editorial Comments”, 39 Common Market Law Review (2002), 942. 
According to the former Prime Minister Berlusconi, states members of the EU can 
decide for themselves whether to conclude a non-surrender agreement with the 
US (“Italy May Exempt US From Tribunal”, Guardian Unlimited, 31 August 
2002). 
67 As a NATO member state, the ASPA provisions do not apply to Italy. 
68 Art. VI: “Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated 
in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of 
which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its 
jurisdiction”. 
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Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Article 146 
(2) of the IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War.69 
The constitutionality of the law giving effect to the non-surrender 
agreement in Italy is also dubious. Indeed, this law would be in contrast 
with Article 10 (1) of the Constitution, according to which the Italian legal 
order conforms to the generally recognized norms of international law. It 
can be maintained that among those norms there are those criminalizing 
international crimes and requiring their prosecution at the national or 
international level.70 The law giving effect to the non-surrender agreement 
would also be in contrast with Article 11 of the Constitution, which 
ensures that EU law prevails over conflicting national laws.71 In fact, the 
conclusion of a non-surrender agreement in its current version would be in 
violation of Article 11 (2) of the EU Treaty, which calls on member state 
to “support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”, and with 
Article 15, according to which “Member States shall ensure that their 
national policies conform to the common positions” adopted by the EU 
Council. In 2001, the Council adopted a common position by which it 
expressed its support for the ICC (qualified as “an essential means of 
promoting respect for international humanitarian law and human rights, 
thus contributing to freedom, security, justice and the rule of law as well as 
contributing to the preservation of peace and the strenghtnening of 
international security”) and urged member states to support the universal 
accession to the Rome Statute.72 The common position adopted on 16 June 
 
69 According to the Geneva Conventions, contracting states are under an 
obligation either to prosecute the accused or to extradite him/her to another 
contracting party concerned (or to an international tribunal: see the commentary to 
Art. 49 (2) of the I Convention, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ 
CONVPRES?OpenView), only if such party “has made out a prima facie case”. 
70 Indeed, the criminalization of certain conduct logically implies that those 
who commit it are penally responsible and must be prosecuted (Zappalà, supra 
note 11, 116). 
71 Art. 11 reads as follows: “Italy […] on conditions of parity with other states, 
agrees to the limitations of sovereignty necessary for an order that ensures peace 
and justice among nations; promotes and encourages international organizations 
having such ends in view” (author’s translation). 
72 Art. 1 of common position 2001/443/CFSP of 11 June 2001, modified by 
common position 2002/474/CFSP of 20 June 2002. One commentator has argued 
that the conclusion of all agreements between the EU and third states, including 
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2003, which has repealed and replaced the previous ones, apart from 
confirming the European support to the Statute’s ratification process and to 
reassert that the non-surrender agreements, in their present version, run 
counter the obligations arising from the Statute and from other 
conventions, states that “[i]t is eminently important that the integrity of the 
Rome Statute be preserved” and recalls the conclusions adopted by the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council on 30 September 2002, 
containing guidelines for member states when considering the necessity 
and scope of possible agreements or arrangements.73 According to these 
guidelines, the agreements should: 1) ensure appropriate investigation and 
– where there is sufficient evidence - prosecution by national jurisdictions 
concerning persons requested by the ICC; 2) only cover persons who are 
not nationals of an ICC state party; 3) only cover persons present on the 
territory of a requested State because they have been sent by a sending 
State; 4) not extend to persons only in transit on the territory of a state 
party to reach the ICC; 5) include a “sunset clause” limiting the period in 
which the arrangement is in force; 6) be ratified by each state in 
accordance with its constitutional procedures.74 It is obvious that the non-
 
admission agreements, should be conditioned on the ratification and 
implementation of the Rome Statute by those states (Mori, supra note 51, 1040). 
73 Common position 2003/444/CFSP of 16 June 2003, Art. 5. Art. 9 (2) also 
requires associated countries to align with the common position, which is 
particularly important if one considers that Romania was the first state to sign a 
non-surrender agreement with the US (the Romanian Parliament eventually 
refused to ratify the agreement: Gamarra Chopo, “La política hostil de Estados 
Unidos contra la Corte penal internacional: los acuerdos del artículo 98 o la 
búsqueda de la impunidad”, 57 Revista española de derecho internacional (2005), 
160). See also the action plan adopted by the EU on 15 February 2004 to follow-
up on the 2003 common position (section B (3) (iii), available at 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC48EN.pdf), which also provides that 
member states should “preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute” and “monitor 
the situation as regards proposals of agreements or arrangements concerning 
conditions for surrender of persons to the ICC, the invocation of article 16 of the 
Rome  Statute and other developments when they might impede the effective 
functioning of the Court” (section B (3) (xiii)). 
74 42 International Legal Materials (2003), 241. For a criticism of the EU 
guidelines, see Amnesty International, International Criminal Court: The Need 
for the European Union to Take More Effective Steps to Prevent Members from 
Signing US Impunity Agreements, AI Index: IOR 40/030/2002, October 2002. In 
particular, the requirement of limiting the conclusion of non-surrender agreements 
to nationals of states non-parties would have the effect of seriously restricting the 
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surrender agreements in their present version do not meet these 
requirements.75 It is also to be recalled that the crimes under the ICC 
jurisdiction fall within the scope of application of the Framework Decision 
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
member states (EAW), adopted by the EU Council on 13 June 2002, which 
replaces formal extradition procedures among member states with a 
simplified surrender procedure implying the inapplicability of the 
traditional rules regulating (and limiting) extradition.76 A non-surrender 
agreement which submits to the consent of the state of nationality or of 
employ the surrender or transfer of an individual to any entity or third state 
in order to eventually surrender him/her to the ICC might be in contrast 
with the Framework Decision.77 
The non-compatibility with the EU membership of the conclusion of 
agreements undermining the effective implementation of the Rome Statute 
has also been stressed by the European Parliament in a resolution adopted 
on 26 September 2002, which qualifies as “misuse” the reference to Article 
98 (2) as the legal basis for the non-surrender agreements.78 The non-
 
ICC jurisdiction, which extends to crimes committed on the territory of a state 
party by nationals of non-parties (Art. 12). 
75 On 13 August 2002, after Romania signed a non-surrender agreement with 
the US, an internal opinion of the Legal Service of the EU Commission stressed 
that such agreements are in contrast with the object and purpose of the Rome 
Statute and thus in violation of the general obligation to perform the obligations 
arising from the Statute in good faith. The common positions adopted by the EU 
Council were considered incompatible with the conclusion of the non-surrender 
agreements (the text can be read in 23 Human Rights Law Journal (2002), 158–
159). 
76 Art. 2 (2). Italy implemented the Framework Decision by Law no. 69 of 
22 April 2005. 
77 See Mori, supra note 51, 1042. However, the EAW will not play a major role 
in the cooperation with the ICC, since it only governs relations between states. 
The Framework Decision does not permit direct or indirect surrenders to the 
Court, but only facilitates extradition between member states. Indeed, the term 
“surrender”, as used in the EAW, means extradition within the EU or EAW states 
parties (while the term “extradition” is used with reference to third states), and not 
to international criminal tribunals. The EAW might then be relevant in a Pinochet 
type situation, i.e., in surrender from one EAW state to another for the purposes of 
prosecution of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, but not in surrenders 
from a EAW state to the Court itself. 
78 P5_TA-PROV(2002)0049, 26 September 2002, para. 5. See also resolution 
P5_TA-PROV(2002)0521, adopted on 24 October 2002, and the resolution of the 
ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, adopted in Brazzaville on 3 April 2003, 
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compatibility with the EU membership arises from the fact that the Rome 
Statute is “an essential component of the democratic model and values of 
the European Union”.79 
The law giving effect to the non-surrender agreement in the Italian 
legal order might also be declared in contrast with Article 11 of the 
Constitution by the Constitutional Court from another point of view. It 
could be maintained that the ICC is “an order that ensures peace and 
justice among nations” in favour of which Italy, on conditions of parity 
with other states, agrees to the necessary limitations of sovereignty, and 
“an international organization having such ends in view” which Italy 
promotes and encourages. In fact, the preamble of the Rome Statute 
provides that the ICC crimes “threaten the peace, security and well-being 
of the world” (para. 3) and that the purpose of the Court is “to put an end 
to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes” and “to guarantee lasting respect for and the 
enforcement of international justice” (paras. 5 and 11).80 
 
which states that “the agreements proposed by the USA are contrary to the Rome 
Statute and to the Treaty commitments of the EU Member States” and declares 
that “ratifying such an agreement is incompatible with membership of an 
association with the EU or the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly” 
(www.iccnow.org/documents/ACP-EURes_BIAApril2003.pdf?PHPSESSID=8cb 
aecac7cc0c592b7614fc944b8d697). On the relations between the ACP countries 
and the EU in the field of human rights, see Pillitu, La tutela dei diritti dell’uomo 
e dei principi democratici nelle relazioni della Comunità e dell’Unione Europea 
con gli Stati ACP (Torino: Giappichelli, 2003). The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe also declared itself “greatly concerned by the efforts of 
some States to undermine the integrity of the ICC Treaty and especially to 
conclude bilateral agreements aiming at exempting their officials, military 
personnel and nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court” (resolution 1300 of 25 
September 2002, para. 9). Such agreements are considered “non admissible under 
the international law governing treaties, in particular the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, according to which States must refrain from any action which 
would not be consistent with the object and the purpose of a treaty” (para. 10). 
Member and observer states of the Council of Europe are thus required not to 
conclude non-surrender agreements. See also resolution 1336 of 25 June 2003. 
79 Para. 4. Art. 6 (1) of the EU Treaty provides that “[t]he Union is founded on 
the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member 
States”. 
80 Limitations to Italian sovereignty are admitted only as long as the core 
principles of the Constitution and inalienable human rights are preserved. Among 
these principles, one can mention the Republican form of state (Art. 139) and 
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Finally, it is worth mentioning that a non-surrender agreement could 
not be concluded by the Italian government “in simplified form”, i.e. 
without the ratification by the President of the Republic and without 
involving the Parliament in the decision. Indeed, under Italian 
constitutional law executive agreements cannot be concluded in the 
matters listed in Article 80 of the Constitution and a non-surrender 
agreement could easily be considered “of a political nature”.81 
Furthermore, if legislation fully and effectively implementing the non-self 
executing provisions of the Rome Statute were at last passed, the non-
surrender agreement would also entail “modifications of laws”.82 For the 
same reasons, a non-surrender agreement could not be secretly concluded 
by the Italian government without informing the Parliament of its 
existence or content.83 Should the non-surrender agreement be concluded 
in simplified form or secretly, the agreement would be invalid under 
Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides that a state can invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a 
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent if that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of 
fundamental importance. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The US position towards the ICC is the result of a series of well-known 
concerns. Washington’s aim is that Americans are tried solely before US 
 
other principles on which the Constitution itself is based, such as the right to 
democracy and to jurisdictional protection. It is however unlikely that such 
principles could conflict with the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
81 Although the President of the Republic is the organ competent for the 
ratification of treaties (Art. 87), Art. 80 of the Constitution provides that the 
Parliament must authorize by law the ratification of international treaties which 
are of a political nature, provide for arbitration or judicial settlements, entail 
territorial changes, financial costs or modifications of laws. 
82 As of September 2006, though, a draft implementing law has not yet been 
submitted to the Parliament, although several ministerial commissions have been 
established to study the matter and draft the legislation implementing the 
provisions of the Rome Statute which are not self-executing (Roscini, “Great 
Expectations: the Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy”, 5 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2007), forthcoming). 
83 Benvenuti, “Corte penale internazionale, Unione europea ed ‘Exemption 
agreements’”, 4 Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo (2002), at XXI. On secret 
treaties, see Treves, supra note 64, 679–681. 
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courts, to the exclusion of any other tribunal, be it national or international. 
Security Council resolutions no. 1422, 1487, 1497, 1593 and the non-
surrender agreements should thus be set as efforts by the US to prevent the 
exercise of the ICC jurisdiction over nationals of states non-parties to the 
Rome Statute. However, if resolution 1422 and the non-surrender 
agreements do not exclude the jurisdiction of the Court but only hamper it 
(by deferring it or by prohibiting the surrender of the accused), the 
resolutions on Liberia and Sudan go further by providing for the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the contributing state not party to the Statute over its 
officials, personnel and nationals, thus excluding not only the jurisdiction 
of the ICC but also of the states entitled to prosecute the crime under the 
principles of territoriality, passive nationality and, where applicable, 
universal jurisdiction. 
The differences do not end here. If resolutions 1422 and 1497 confine 
their scope of application ratione personæ to the current and former 
officials or personnel of the contributing state not party to the Statute, 
resolution 1593 and the bilateral non-surrender agreements extend to any 
national, regardless of whether the person is or was in the employ of the 
state non-party. On the other hand, if the Security Council resolutions only 
apply to acts or omissions arising out of or related to an operation 
established or authorized by the UN (or, in the case of resolution 1593, by 
the African Union), the non-surrender agreements generically require that 
the nationals of one party be “present” on the territory of the other, 
regardless of the reason of such presence. 
None of the examined resolutions can be seen as an exercise of the 
Security Council’s power to request the ICC not to commence or proceed 
with investigations or prosecutions under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. 
Indeed, such power was conceived with regard to identifiable situations 
where the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC could prejudice the 
maintainance of international peace and security, and not to future and 
vague scenarios. Furthermore, by adopting resolutions 1422 and 1487 and 
by including the paragraphs on the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
contributing state in resolutions 1497 and 1593, the Security Council has 
acted ultra vires, since no threat to the peace can be found in order to 
justify the exercise of Chapter VII powers. The above mentioned 
resolutions are also in contrast with the principles and purposes of the UN. 
For these reasons, the binding character of such resolutions on the UN 
member states and on the ICC itself can be seriously doubted. 
As to the bilateral non-surrender agreements, they cannot be qualified 
as “international agreements pursuant to which the consent of the sending 
State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court” as 
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required by Article 98 (2) of the Statute. First, absent the consent of the 
state of nationality or of employ, they prohibit the surrender to the ICC not 
only of individuals who have “sent” by a party, but also of those who are 
simply “present” on the territory of the other. Furthermore, like the 
resolutions on Liberia and Sudan, they do not call on the state to which the 
accused has been transferred to investigate and prosecute the case, thus 
creating a high risk of impunity. 
Should Italy conclude a non-surrender agreement with the US, it 
would have to comply with competing obligations (on the one hand the 
non-surrender agreement, on the other the Rome Statute and the 
conventions on the prevention and repression of international crimes 
containing the principle aut dedere aut judicare), thus exposing itself to 
the risk of committing an internationally wrongful act. Italy would also 
breach its obligation to perform the Rome Statute in good faith and not to 
defeat its object and purpose. Finally, the law giving effect to the non-
surrender agreement in the Italian legal order would be in contrast with 
Articles 10 (1) and 11 of the Constitution. 
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“current or former 
officials or personnel 
from a contributing 
State not a Party to 
the Rome Statute” 
“current or former 
officials or personnel 
from a contributing 
state, which is not a 
party to the Rome 
Statute” 
“nationals, current or 
former officials or 
personnel from a 
contributing State 
outside Sudan which is 
not a party to the Rome 
Statute” 
“current or former 
Government officials, 
employees (including 
contractors), or military 






“acts or omissions 




“all alleged acts or 
omissions arising out 
of or related to the 
Multinational Force 
or United Nations 
stabilization force in 
Liberia” 
“all alleged acts or 
omissions arising out of 
or related to operations 
in Sudan established or 
authorized by the 
[Security] Council or 
the African Union” 
Not specified; 
presumably, only the 










authorized by the 
United Nations  
Multinational Force 
or United Nations 
stabilization force in 
Liberia 
Operations in Sudan 
established or 
authorized by the UN 
Security Council or by 
the African Union  
A link with an operation 
is not necessary, it 
suffices that the 
individuals are “present” 









where the operations 
established or 
authorized by the 
United Nations are 
carried out 






parties to the 
Rome Statute 
State which has 
jurisdiction under the 
usual principles; the 
complementary 
jurisdiction of the 
ICC is not excluded, 
but cannot be 
exercised for 
12 months renewable 
Exclusive 
jurisdiction of the 
contributing state not 
party to the Rome 
Statute over its 
current or former 
officials or personnel 
Exclusive jurisdiction 
of the contributing state 
not party to the Rome 
Statute (apart from 
Sudan) over its 
nationals and current or 
former officials or 
personnel 
State which has 
jurisdiction under the 
usual principles; the 
complementary 
jurisdiction of the ICC is 
not excluded, but the 
above mentioned persons 
cannot be surrendered or 
otherwise transferred to it 
“by any means” and “for 
any purpose” without the 
consent of the state of 
nationality or of employ 
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